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CONVERGENCE THEORY IN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETIES

Carbota 1st

In the recent decades, both the economic systems, the socialist and the capitalist one, (whose main representatives are the Soviet Union and the United States of America), have become more and more clear-cut and separately defined. They pretend their aim to be the happiness and prosperity of the greatest number, and they make use of the same means: industrialization. The Soviet Union has started the build-up of manufacturing industries under state control, the United States of America and other Western countries have achieved a continuous and rapid development in their economical systems.

These two facts affect each of both systems in such a way in their respective social and economic spheres, that comparison becomes unavoidable. The common features in both societies

are numerous and obvious, as regards technical and social problems. Differences, of course, exist: Western and Soviet countries differ completely in their basic social doctrines and political systems.

Thus, only because of their common need and use of science and technology, are these two types of societies comparable; and this is so, because both can be defined as modern industrial societies. A further comparison between the effects that industrialization produces upon the social structure and the disappearance or persistence of social inequality in these two systems is the question we would try to analyze in this paper.

First of all, it is necessary to define what a modern industrial society is. Both types of societies are considered as industrial societies, in the general sense that "techniques of production and patterns of economic organization which had endured for thousands of years have been replaced by new and radically different ones. (1)

In a more accurate sense, modern industrial societies can be defined in contrast to the agrarian (Aensky) or the archaic ones (Aron). From the technological standpoint, the more advanced societies of the present day, differ greatly from the agrarian. As Aensky points out: "the raw materials used are far more diversified, the sources of energy quite diffe-

ment, and the tools for more complex and efficient" (2). Raymond Aron defines industrial society as "a type of society which appears to open up a new era in human experience" (3). We could conclude that modern industrial societies are the result of the qualitative leaps to a new era of civilisation by the utilisation of new and accumulative knowledge.

Two common features can then be seen in modern industrial societies:

- a) the qualitative difference between the present day and the previous science and technology.
- b) the fact that quantities of resources have multiplied, not only the consumption of traditional sources of energy but other resources as well, like iron and raw materials as stone, sand, gravel, cement, phosphates; has been increased.

As a consequence of these two main factors, other features become characteristic of modern societies; namely, the lengthening of the life-span, the steady increase in national out-put, the predominant concern with production and expansion, the creation of an artificial environment for human life, vast labour and administrative organisation, specialisation, intellectual and social rationalisation, etc. None of these phenomena would appear in modern societies without the development of science and technology and their application in industry, as both the development and the application are the basic and indispensable

prerequisites for it.

All the above mentioned characteristics can be found in the Soviet and Western types of industrial societies, as the result of their need of rationalization and the consequent buildup of large units of production.

Western societies are compelled to adopt large-scale patterns of production and the state's intervention in administering and organizing the production and distribution of goods, in order to increase profits continuously, and to achieve a material well-being, as well as to fulfill the "American Dream", that is, to ensure that each citizen is rewarded "according to his abilities", within a general context of prosperity.

In Soviet-type societies too, the establishing of a socialist state has implied prosperity and well-being. The state, by definition, decides production and distribution, it assumes the role of "direct regulator", when the "principle of distribution based on property" ceases to operate with the abolition of the capitalist ownership of the means of production. This principle of property is substituted by the principle "to each according to his work", or the social product determined by the quality and the quantity of an individual's job. (4).

Industrialization in both systems has led to new occupations as office-workers, supervisors, managers, technicians, etc; and more possibilities to get a job. On the other hand, specialization and more skilled education

are required for the new occupations. We agree with Dahrendorf that "today the allocation of social positions is increasingly the task of the educational system" (5). Worsky takes account of this need in socialist countries, when he says that "wages are a function of the quality of work, that is, that they are a function of the level of skill and education necessary for carrying out a given job" (6). So, industrialization requires "an educational system functionally related to the skills and professions imperative to its technology" (7).

By some sociologists, industrialization has been regarded as a process that tends to bring about a greater equality of life conditions in society. The development of industrialization breaks down any rigid and exclusive difference of rank by creating unprecedented opportunities for social mobility, by extending and improving education to meet the new scientific and technological needs, and by raising enormously the general level of living, thus reducing ~~down~~ the harshness of the contrast between the conditions of the upper and lower strata of society.

In Western societies, the increase of opportunities for individual social mobility, the enormous growth, in the past years, of the total national income and the increasing intervention of the State, have led to the idea of a partial but limited trend towards a "classless" society. In Soviet-type societies, such egalitarian ideas have also been diffused. Since, with the abolition of private ownership of

the means of production and the state's centralization, the hierarchical class structure, has theoretically, disappeared, the construction of a classless society is under way. Changes in the social structure of both systems seem to be clear.

The view of industrial development as the prime determinant in the change of the stratification systems of advanced industrial societies has been pointed out, mainly, by American sociologists in the sixties.

The so-called "convergence theory" stresses the standardizing effects upon social structures of the exigencies of modern technology and of an advanced economy. The concept "convergence" refers to the fact that, in the course of changing the social structures of at least two, previously different, societies become more similar. (8). Its converse, the concept of "divergence", refers to the fact that, in the course of changing the social structures of at least two societies become less similar. In addition to convergent and divergent patterns of change, there is the possibility that "parallel" changes may occur. These three patterns of change may also be classified according to whether they are total (i.e. all elements in the structure of a society are affected) or partial (i.e. only some elements are affected). The concept "convergence" does not mean that, at any given time, the structures of the two societies are necessarily identical, nor does it mean that they will necessarily become identical in the future. Similarly, the fact that two societies may be different at a

given moment in time, indicates nothing about their past or future patterns of change, whether there are convergent, divergent or parallel. "Problems of convergence, divergence and parallelism, therefore, should not be confused with problems of similarity and difference" say Dunning and Hoppper (9).

The general pattern of change is one in which, once countries enter into the advanced stage of industrialization, they tend to become increasingly comparable in their major institutional arrangements and in their social systems. In brief, a convergent pattern of development is hypothesized, though not predicted or extrapolated.

In 1960, "Industrialism and Industrial Man" by C. Herr, J. T. Dunlop, F. H. Harbison, and C. A. Myers, was published. In their conception, industrialism is a "system of social organization where industries, including many large-scale industries, are the dominant method of production" (10). They affirm that all advanced societies tend to develop in the direction of a "pluralistic industrialism, that means, a form of complex and internally diverse industrial society in which the distribution of power is not disputed by antagonistic classes, but by an "omnipresent State" (11) who regulates competition and conflict between a multiplicity of interest groups on the basis of an accepted "web of rules", required to make the industrial system operative. At the same time, the "omnipresent State" provides the means through which a degree of democratic control can be exercised over the working of the

economy and other social processes.

A central theme in the convergence theory regards the possible emergence in advanced societies, of a new type of society, as a consequence of industrialism. Society, in Kerr's terms, becomes divided between managers and managed, as the two main social groups. Kerr and his associates define management from four different points of view. (12). Firstly, it can be considered as an economic resource or factor of production. In this respect it is a sort of human capital, which has to be generated and accumulated. Secondly, management is a class, into which access is restricted and depends on family relationships, political connections, technical competence, or the combination of the three. Thirdly, it may be looked upon as an internal system of authority. The manager takes decisions concerning production and extends his personal control over all phases of the business. Fourthly, management can be viewed as a rule-making authority over the managed. In his relationships to workers, the manager establishes, legitimates and maintains his authority. He seeks control over any of the factors which must be coordinated in the "planning - production - selling" process.

In close relation to the manager, the managed, that is, the industrial labour force, develops. As Kerr points out: "the members of this working force must learn to accept the authority of managers in place of the family, the tribe or village" (13). Industrialization involves a set of new rules governing relationships between those who give and those who take orders, even if there is no precise dividing line between the managerial group and the industrial labour force.

In the development of an industrial labour force, there are four interrelated processes. First, recruitment, that means, selection and assignment of persons to jobs. Second, commitment, which consists of achieving the worker's permanent attachment to and acceptance of industrial employment as a way of life. Commitment is a longer and far more intricate process than recruitment. Third, advancement of human resources, which is the process of building the skills, the work habits and the incentives for productive employment. It requires varying degrees of training and a national organizational system of the working force. Fourth, maintenance of the general welfare and security of the workers, by means of unemployment insurance, accident compensation, old age annuities, etc.

Manager and managed are closely related in the process of industrialization. But those who "lead to the march of industrialism" are exactly the former, whereas the industrial workers can only influence the election, the performance and the survival of the "industrializing élites" (14). These élites are, (a) the dynasty élite (originally drawn from the landed or commercial aristocracy), (b) the middle classes (drawn from commercial or artisan groups), (c) the new class of revolutionary intellectuals and associated activities (who intend to eliminate the former groups in the task of leadership), (d) the colonial administrators (who, in fact, do serve the home country rather than the indigenous population) and (e) the nationalist leaders and the State.

Industrialization creates industrial workers, managers and a State, active in industrial relations. Managers and State become "industrial

"élites" (15) and distinguish themselves more and more from the industrial workers. A hierarchy has been established. At the top we find rather small groups of business managers (in the United States) or Party functionaries (in the Soviet Union). In capitalist societies the ruling élite is divided in several groups with basic divergent interests, although, apparently, they share important common aspirations. On the contrary, in socialist societies, the ruling élite is monolithic.

Another difference between ruling élites in both systems is its origin. In capitalist societies it exists a high degree of congruence between upper class and ruling class. In socialist countries, the "new class" as M. Djilas denominates it, has its origin in the proletariat. The new class represents "the interests of the proletariat and the poor until (it) establishes its power and authority" (16). A new and governing class is born from the exploited class.

The working class in industrial societies does not become more and more homogenized by the process of industrialization, as marxist and right-wing writers have predicted, in the sense that occupational differentiation has been largely increased in the last decades. Three strata can be distinguished within the working class: the skilled workers and men of crafts, the semi-skilled workers and the unskilled (17). The distinctions between these three strata of workers are hardening, there is no solidarity among them. The predicted unity of the working class is doubtful. We can, with Bahrendorf, conclude, that "the increasing differentiation as well as homogeneity of classes has been checked by the decomposition of labour and capital, the emergence of white-collar workers

We can conclude that, in spite of industrialization, barriers between working class, ~~and~~ middle class and ruling class, have not disappeared in modern industrial societies. Even within the growing middle class, differences of strata harshly persist. The nature of everyone of the traditional classes (workers and employees; or, ruled and rulers) and middle class has changed, but classes and social differentiation continue to exist in both considered types of society.

With industrialization common features have appeared in capitalist as well as in socialist societies which have permitted to compare them in both economic (large-scale industry, new form of division of labour, rational calculation of the production) and social spheres.

But industrialization has not dealt to the optimistic idea of a "classless" society. May be, it is true that a "limit of equality" or a "fundamental inequality of social structure" (in both systems), based in the inequality of power and authority, which accompanies social organization", (20), is unavoidable.

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DAHRENDORF : Theory of Class Conflict

The starting point of Dahrendorf's theory of social conflict is the assumption that social conflict is ubiquitous, because it has its origin in the very structure of society. Conflict exists not only in any human society, but whenever there is life (1). "All societies know social conflict" (2). Says Dahrendorf, being conflict not a disruptive element in society, in the sense of destruction of social stability; but, on the contrary, an essential feature of the structure and process of a society. Conflict dynamises the social system, it leads to social change, it provokes "creativity, innovation and development in the life of the individual, his group and society" (3).

The concept of conflict implies the notion of ^{antagonistic} relationship (4) between individual and individual, emotion and emotion within and individual; group and group in the case of class conflict.

Conflict between groups takes place within the framework of the so-called : imperatively coordinated association or the unit of social analysis within which groups are in conflict. Dahrendorf defines it in the context of a society or social organization where coherence is due to force and constraint (coercion theory of society), rather than to voluntary cooperation or general consensus (integration theory of society).

From the point of view of the integration theory of social structure, the units of social analysis, namely, the "social systems" (Parsons), are, essentially voluntary associations of people who share certain values and set up institutions in order to ensure the smooth functioning of the social system. In terms of the coercion theory, Dahrendorf defines the units of social analysis, in analogy to the notion of "social system": "in looking at social organisations not in terms of their integration and coherence, but from the point of view of their structure of coercion and constraint, we regard them as imperatively coordinated associations, rather than as social systems" (5).

"Imperatively coordinated associations" is Dahrendorf's translation of Max Weber's category: Herrschaftsverbände. They are defined as associations or organized bodies of persons who are subject to authority relations by virtue of a prevailing order (6). By "Imperative Coordination", Dahrendorf means authority, which again is defined in terms of Max Weber's category of Herrschaft, as the "probability that a command with a given specific content will ^{be} obeyed by a given group of persons". Authority is based on the belief in the ^{legitimation} legitimacy of institutionalized norms and the right of command on the part of those invested with authority by these norms. Authority is a legitimate relation of domination and subjection. It is always associated with social positions or roles of the individual rather than with ~~individuals~~ his personality (as power is).

The groups in an imperatively coordinated association have a structure, a form of organization, a program or goal, and a personnel of members, as common features. But they hold different rather opposed or conflicting interests, which characterize and differentiate them. They are therefore, conflict groups or interest groups.

Conflict groups become dichotomous because of the dichotomous distribution of authority in any social organization. That means that there are two and only two conflict groups of distinct sets of positions of persons who participate or are excluded from the exercise of authority within any imperatively coordinated association. One of both groups has authority and is in a position of domination, the other one has not authority and is in a position of subjection. The general and universal relation of authority is what determines the formation of conflict groups and conflict between them. "The distribution of authority in an association or unit of social analysis, is the ultimate cause, the structural determinant of conflict groups", says Dahrendorf, and further, "differentiated equipped authority positions in associations (imperatively coordinated associations), involve, for their incumbents, conflicting interests" (8).

Dahrendorf does not use the term class in the traditional (Marxian) sense to define what he calls conflict groups, because he is aware that what in the nineteenth century was called "class" by Marx, is not applicable to the social reality he is examining, i.e. advanced industrial societies, post-capitalist societies. Conflict groups are more general terms than classes; classes are defined in relation to the

ownership of the means of production, conflict groups to the authority structure of an imperatively coordinated association. The category of authority is larger than the category of property, in fact, relations of property are relations of authority, but not vice versa. So, a more general term has appeared to design^{to} more general concept. (Economic) classes are, for Dahrendorf, just a kind of conflict group. Conflict is not defined by Dahrendorf as leading inevitably to a violent clash (Civil War, in Marxian terms), but in a broader sense, ^{to} _{as} all kind of relations between sets of individuals which have antagonistic interests and any kind of clash of interests independently of the violence of its expression.

Dahrendorf's theory of class conflict, or class action as he calls it too, is based in the theory of formation of conflict groups. The substance of the class conflict theory could be summarized in one statement: conflict groups, once they have emerged and organized themselves, engage in conflicts that affect structure changes.

Class conflicts vary according to the influence of two factors or categories: Intensity and violence. Intensity refers to the "energy expenditure and degree of involvement of conflicting parties" (9). A particular conflict may be said to be of high intensity if the cost of victory or defeat is high for the parties concerned. The cost aspect is crucial; it seems to be related to the idea of risk (for a person or for a group). By contrast to its intensity, the violence of conflict relates rather to its manifestations than to its causes, it is a matter of the weapons that are chosen by conflict groups to express their hostilities. A continuum can be constructed ranging from peaceful discussions to militant struggles such as strikes and Civil wars. The scale of degrees of violence includes, for Dahrendorf, discussion and debate, contest and competition, struggle and war. Violent class struggles or class wars are only one point on this scale.

Intensity and violence vary independently. Whether or not class conflict expresses itself in militant clashes of interests is in principle independent of the intensity of involvement of the parties. Although intensity and violence vary independently, they are affected in different degree by the same factors. One basic factor is the conditions of organization of interest groups which continue to affect group conflict even after the complete formation of conflict groups. However, conditions of organization affect much more the violence than the intensity of conflict.

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because through organization conflict becomes integrated or absorbed by the social system. Intensity is affected by a multitude of possible conflicts of different associations, which appear super-imposed, i.e. the opponents of one association meet again, in identical relations although with different titles, in another association. As a consequence, the personnel of the conflict groups of different associations is the same.

Intensity is also affected by the positive correlation between authority position and other aspects of socioeconomic status in terms of strictly occupational rewards such as income, job security and general social security. The lower the correlation is between authority position and other aspects of socioeconomic status is, the less intense are class conflict likely to be, and vice versa. Another factor which affects the intensity of conflict is mobility (inter and intra-generational mobility). There is an inverse correlation between openness of classes and the intensity of class conflict. The more upward and downward mobility there is, in a society, the less fundamental are class conflicts to be. As mobility increases, class conflict decreases and is replaced by competition between individuals. For Dahrendorf, competition is included in the notion of conflict, both involving a striving for scarce resources. So, mobility affects social conflict reducing it to a lower degree in the scale of violence, i.e. to competition.

All the above mentioned factors affect much more intensity than violence of social conflict. Violence is especially affected by conflict regulation. "Probably effective conflict regulation is also some consequence for the intensity of group conflict", says Dahrendorf, "but this important process is above all concerned with expressions and manifestations of conflict, and it therefore determines degree of violence rather than intensity" (11).

By the regulation of social conflict, Dahrendorf means ^{forms} such of conflict control as address themselves to the expressions of conflict rather than their causes, and as imply the continued existence of antagonism of interest and interest groups. He warns us to not to confuse the concept of regulation with the concepts of resolution (which addresses itself to the causes rather than the expressions of social conflict, and implies its elimination) or suppression (which Dahrendorf assumes to be impossible and undesirable in the long run because it implies the non-recognition and exclusion

of the opposition which is only possible for a short time, one decade; but not for ever).

An effective regulation of conflict implies the presence of at least three factors: a) both parties have to recognize the necessity and the reality of the conflict situation, and therefore the divergence and opposition of the opponent. b) regulation need ^{the} organization of interest groups to be effective, and c) the opposing parties in social conflicts have to agree in certain formal rules of the game that provide the framework of their relations.

Once these prerequisites of conflict regulation are present, three forms of regulation can be defined. The first form of conflict regulation consists in the operation of certain institutions which provide the framework for discussions of and decisions about conflicting issues. In general, these institutions may be described as parliamentary or quasi-parliamentary bodies in which conflicting interest groups or their representatives meet in order to carry on their conflict in a relatively peaceful and patterned manner. The very creation of parliamentary or quasi-parliamentary bodies of this kind involves a considerable reduction in the violence of group conflicts. Those who have agreed to carry on their disagreements by means of discussions do not usually engage in physical violence. Moreover, the violence of conflicts would seem to decrease as the effectiveness of parliamentary institutions increases. At the same time, the presence of such institutions does not generally guarantee that violent conflicts will be avoided altogether.

A second form of conflict regulation is mediation. Here, both parties agree to consult an outsider who is asked to give advice but whose advice will have no binding force for the parties. In fact, mediation is the most successful type of conflict regulation, affirms Dahrendorf. Examples of this form of conflict regulation are frequent in industrial and international conflicts but rather rare in political conflicts. The third form is arbitration. There are two types of arbitration, differing in the kind of commitment to an arbitrator to which conflicting parties have agreed. Conflicting parties are free to reject the arbitrator's decision. The task of arbitration is to find a workable compromise between conflicting issues (political arbitration), which in terms of conflict theory can be successful; or, to judge the merits of conflicting issues in terms of "right" or

"wrong" (judicial arbitration)

These three forms of conflict regulation, i.e., conciliation, mediation and arbitration, may operate as successive stages of conflict regulation or can be applied individually in any given situations; they are the mechanisms for reducing the violence of class conflict, although class conflict itself will not disappear.

Class conflict, or groups conflicts of the class type do never disappear although they can be mitigated in its violence, says Dahrendorf, and; further more they result in structure changes. Structure changes are thus brought about by class conflict. So, because of class conflict and under specific conditions, particular modes of structure change can be expected.

By structure change, Dahrendorf means "changes involving the personnel of positions of domination in imperatively coordinated associations" (12). As the distribution of authority in associations is the focal object (the determining element, as has it been pointed out before) of class conflict, changes resulting from class conflict are in their formal aspect always changes in these authority structures or in their personnel; in fact, changes in the personnel occupying positions of domination and possessing authority to realize their own specific interests. In this sense, changes of personnel are not in themselves structure changes, but merely a condition for the arising of new interests, others than those of the people who occupy positions of domination (i.e., the "ruling class" or "elite"). Changes of personnel are, then, mere instruments for changes of social structure, on both the normative and the institutional levels.

There are three modes of structure change: 1) Total exchange of the personnel of positions of domination in an association. One example of it is the association of the State, where three parties exist. In this association, a total exchange of the personnel of positions of domination would involve the replacement of all cabinet ministers, high civil servants, etc. Total exchange of ruling personnel might also be described as revolutionary change. 2) A second mode of structure change is the partial exchange of the personnel of positions of domination. Such partial change signifies evolutionary rather than revolutionary change. This is the case when a majority party chose to form a coalition with the smaller of the two opposition parties, so that, it can influence in the policies of the ruling class. 3) The third mode of structure change by class conflict does not involve any change

of personnel. This is the slowest type of evolution and requires particular skill. This is the case when the majority and opposition remain stable and distinct over long periods of time, but the majority party incorporates proposals and interests of the opposition in its legislation and policies.

The second mode of structure exchange, the partial exchange of personnel is evidently a broad category that covers the whole field between total exchange and complete stability. However, while it may be said that structure change is more sudden in the extent to which more personnel is exchanged, this does not necessarily mean that it is also more radical. Suddenness and radicalness of structure change are two dimensions of this phenomena which can vary independently, such as the intensity and violence of class conflict can vary independently.

There is a close relation between the radicalness-suddenness dimensions of structure change and the intensity-violence dimension of class conflict. It may be argued, however, that the suddenness of change varies directly with the violence of conflict: the more violent class conflict is, the more sudden the changes brought by it is. In this sense, conflict regulation serves to reduce the suddenness of changes.

In general, it can be said (although not at any time or historical situation) that modes of structure change co-vary with different modes of class conflict. The more intense class conflict is, the more radical are the changes likely to be, which it brings about; the more violent class conflict is, the more sudden are structure changes resulting from it, likely to be; structure change being the final step in the process produced by conflict, and the final element in the theory of class conflict by Dahrendorf.

For Dahrendorf authority relations determine the formation of conflict groups, of interests of these conflict groups, of conflict generated between them and the structure change provoked by them.

Dahrendorf takes Weber's category of Herrschaft to define authority, without making explicit the "psychological" element inherent in the definition of authority as the "probability that a command with a given content will be obeyed by a given group of persons". Does it mean that one person or group will be obeyed because of

charismatic qualities of the person or group who commands, or because of the need to obey for a given person or group? Dahrendorf does not explain if authority has ~~any~~ which kind of basis or support authority has, whether psychological or material (in the Marxian sense) , or any other.

If authority has, as Dahrendorf affirms, its origin in the very structure of society, being society a moral community, where norms are backed by rewards and punishments, a vicious circle appears. Do norms exist and are they established by those who have authority and are in a position of domination; or, is there authority because norms exist which guarantee it?

Moreover, authority is defined as a more general category than property and status, because ^{as} Dahrendorf says, every relation of property is a relation of authority, but not the other way around. He makes this statement without proving it; authority is a more general category by definition.

~~His~~ Dahrendorf's theory of class conflict is based on the whole, in general assumptions like: in ^{all} ~~the~~ societies there is conflict, in any given unit of analysis exist relations of authority which determine conflict and lead to structural change. He speculates with categories he uses to bring consistency and coherence to the whole of his theory, but he does not prove any of his assertions, either empirically or theoretically.

Authority = type of ^{social} relations analytically independent of economic conditions

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MASS MEDIA and OPINION CHANGE

The problem of the influence of mass media on the masses and its impact on the beliefs, judgements, values, opinions and voting behaviour of a mass audience, is related to the conditions under which persuasive communication of evaluative judgements succeeds or fails.

There still is a common impression among experts in propaganda and advertising that mass media can manipulate the public. Research studies, however, have proved that mass communications generally fail to produce any marked changes in social attitudes or actions; but, ~~on the contrary~~, they tend to reinforce the pre-existing beliefs and values of the audience. Mass communication produces, in fact, powerful resistance in the public.

A persuasive communication is successful when it decreases the intensity of psychological resistances of the recipient in an audience. The exposure of evaluative judgements requires, moreover, not only adequate physical transmission of the mes-

sage but also attention, comprehension and acceptance by the audience, in order to produce ^{change} attitudes and beliefs, which are reflected in opinions.

There is acceptance of persuasive communication when the message is given by someone who is initially accorded relatively high prestige⁽¹⁾ by the audience or when arguments are attributed to a relatively trustworthy source. But this does not imply that when the communicator is not trusted by the audience or has not prestige, persuasive communication will be less effective. In the long run, with the passage of time, the content of a message is no longer spontaneously associated with the source, and acceptance reaches a high level as well.

Another problem related to the ~~problem~~ acceptance of persuasive communication is whether persuasion is more effective when it concentrates exclusively on the arguments supporting the propagandist's position or when it includes discussion (and/or refutation) of the opposing arguments (2).

Various propaganda strategists (in Hitler's time, for example) have put forth that no opposing arguments should be

discussed because "mentioning rival ideas invites comparison, hesitation and doubt" (3). But this generalization is not likely to be true when an audience initially disagrees with the views advocated by the communicator. In this case, a two-sided presentation (including mention of opposing as well as supporting arguments) is much more effective in producing opinion change in the desired direction than was a one-sided presentation (which mentioned only arguments supporting the communicator's position). The one-sided presentation seems to be more effective with those members who are already favorably disposed toward the communicator's position, and is unaware of the arguments of the other side of the issue. When the audience is strongly opposed to the position being advocated, a persuasive message is generally more effective if it includes the opposing arguments than if it presents only the arguments in favour of one side of the issue. Two-sided communication might be more advantageous in the long run because the audience will be familiarized with counter-arguments, even if one-sided communication can have immediate change in the audience.

In general, it could be said that under conditions where the audience

is subsequently exposed to counter propaganda arguing in favour of the opposing position, a persuasive communication which advocates a definitive position on a controversial issue is more effective in the long run if it presents and discusses the opposing arguments than if it presents only the arguments that support the communicator's conclusion.

If a member of an audience has a strongly "negative" opinion and is familiar with arguments supporting this opinion, presentation of a one-sided communication supporting the "positive" point of view will encounter a comparatively high degree of resistance (i.e. reinforcement of pre-existing beliefs and attitudes). The listener's tendency to think of his own arguments will interfere with acceptance of (or even attention to) the arguments that the communicator is presenting. If, however, the communicator explicitly disavows the listener's own negative arguments, this source of interference ^{will} be reduced. Moreover, the listener ~~may~~ would be more impressed by the communication and less inclined to distrust the argument as coming from a biased source if the communicator makes it clear that he has taken the negative arguments into account.

Another important factor influencing the impact of communication upon an audience is the order in which the mes-

trial is presented, namely, when a controversial issue is being debated, which of both sides have a greater effect: the side of the issue which the individual hears first, or the other side given subsequently. (5)

When the first side has greater impact, the result is called: primary effect. When the second side is more persuasive, the result is described as recency effect. (6)

In 1925 Kendall announced a law of Primary or Persuasion, stating that the side of an issue presented first would have greater effectiveness than the side presented subsequently. Later on, Brownell arrived to the opposite conclusion in his experiment on socialized medicine and labor arbitration. He found out that a significantly greater change was produced in the direction of the side of the issue presented last. Thus, he obtained a recency effect rather than a primary effect.

One possible explanation of the disparity in the results of these two studies could be the different evaluation procedures they employed. In Brownell's study the effects of the two communications were evaluated after both sides have been presented. In Kendall's study, on the other hand, one of the questionnaires was administered immediately after the first side had been presented. This may have had

the effect of requiring the subjects to review the arguments. Thus the measurement process might have had the effect of "freezing" opinion and causing individuals to be less likely to change their opinions once they have committed themselves to a questionnaire. But, since commitment on a questionnaire is not directly related to primary itself, if an explanation of Xeno's results might be attributed to the effect of measurement process rather than to sequence effects.

Hovland does not agree in formulating a general law of Primacy. He rather believes that what should be determined are the conditions which operate to make the first side more effective under some circumstances and the second under others (2)

In general, it could be said, that the primacy effect prove to be extremely pronounced under conditions where the contradictory material was not spontaneously salient and there was no time interval between the first set of arguments and the second, contradictory set. Under other conditions, however, such as where the audience is very familiar with the opposing arguments and has initial doubts about the communicator's honesty, a recency effect will appear, making it more ad-

advantageous to give the counter arguments first with the main affirmative or positive arguments saved for the end of the communication.

So, a relationship between primary effects and the degree to which the individual is already familiar with the issue can be established. In experimental as in real life situations some prior knowledge or familiarity about the topic under discussion can be assumed. Primary should be described not as the ^{first} representation of unknown material to an audience, but as the first portion of any communicated material presented on an issue. The more one succeeds in presenting unfamiliar material, the more one is apt to obtain primary effects. Unfamiliarity with a topic depends also on the interests of the recipient in the issue. The recipient will try to get information on the issue according to his prior attitudes and beliefs. (9)

Elihu Katz emphasizes the importance of personal contacts as more effective than the mass media in influencing people's opinion (10). There are also certain personality attributes that predispose people to be swayed by or to be resistant to, any persuasive message irrespective of what it is said, or who says it. This factor of personal persuasibility indicates that when a large audience is exposed to many different types of per-

mass communications on many different types of issues, some persons are consistently resistant, whereas others are moderately persuadable and others highly persuadable.

Under the assumption that the flow of mass communications may be less direct than was commonly supposed, the hypothesis of the "two-step flow of communication" is formulated (11): "influence stemming from the mass media first reaches 'opinion leaders' who, in turn, pass on what they read and hear to those of their every-day associates for whom they are influential." (12)

This hypothesis involves three aspects: first, the impact of personal influence in changing opinions than the mass media. It was suggested that the mass media more often reinforce predisposition and decisions already taken rather than changing them. Nevertheless, mass media and personal influence are competitive, i.e. a given decision is influenced by one or the other. Secondly, the flow of personal influence, that is, the importance of who will lead and who follows in influence about a subject matter. Brown by, it seems to be that influence is related to the personification of values (~~one~~ who one is) to competence (what one knows) and to strategic position or location within a group (whom one knows). The third aspect of the

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Two-step flow of communication" hypothesis refers to the fact that opinion leaders are more exposed to the mass media than those whom they influence, and they are more affected by the mass media in their own decisions.

The importance of the hypothesis of the "two-step flow of communication" appears in its emphasis on interpersonal relations as channels of communication. They influence the making of decisions by pressure to conform to the group's way of thinking and acting as well as source of social support that comes from being integrated in the group or community.

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WOMEN in Spain

After the Civil War, Spain has been compelled to adopt a policy of economic autarchy (self-sufficiency) and political isolationism (holding aloof from affairs of other countries) in order to rebuild her economy and keep away from the Second World War which was just breaking out. The later defeat of Fascism (Hitler and Mussolini) and the rising of liberal democracies in Europe, enforced Spain's both internal and international policies (autarchy and isolationism) for several years.

About 1959, the break-down of this policy took place. On one hand, Spain's economy recovered little by little from the Civil War, the standard of living increased; more and more, national and non-national goods were provided and demanded, new aspirations (as traveling, to study abroad, etc) appeared, etc. Such increasing demand of material as well as spiritual goods could not longer be satisfied by an autarchic and isolationist policy.

On the other hand, the infiltration of foreign currents of thought by people who have had the chance to go abroad, by people who had any contact with outside Spain, by books and pamphlets illegally introduced into the country, became unavoidable.

In this context the new policy of economic development has started. The two first "Plans of Development" and the third one, which is now under way, have created new labour-ports and new possibilities of employment. Besides that, the process of industrialization that began to be carried out has implied more and more specialized occupations and skilled workers. In all levels of occupations, a higher and more specialized education has been requested.

WOMEN as LABOUR FORCE

A consequence of this economic development has been the increase of the active population and the change in its distribution per economic sector (Agriculture, Industry and Services). This fact has especially affected the feminine active population which has increased enormously in the last fifteen years. (See table I)

In 1950, only 16% of the active population were women. In 1964, the proportion of feminine active population had risen to 24%. We can assume that this proportion is, in fact, even greater, as many women who declare to be just house-~~holders~~^{wives}, are actually working at home or out for a few hours

a day.

Table I

Evolution of the female active population

Year	% Female active population of the total active population	% fem. act. pop. of total female population	% fem. act. pop. of total popu-lation
1950	15.83 (10 793 100)	11.77 (14 507 100)	6.10 (27 976 800)
1960	18.25 —	13.50 —	6.96 —
1961	18.47 —	—	7.08 —
1962	18.75 —	—	7.18 —
1963	—	—	—
1964	23.75 (11 707 600)	72.50	8.47 (31 816 907)
1965	28.00 —	24.00 (15 888 000)	12.00 —

Source: INSEE FOESSA, 1966, page 61

These women are not included in the social insurance (which is an indirect source of collection data) because they do not want to lose the extra benefits their husbands receive for being married, or because the employers refuse to pay the, legally established, insurance quotas for them.

In the countryside the problem of the under-estimation of the number of working women is even greater. Cooperation with men in the agricultural tasks is not considered a proper work by country-people. So, they do not declare, if asked, women's work.

Nevertheless, 12% of women work outside and 14% in their home, as hair-dressers, dressmakers, ~~coopers~~^{peasants}, etc. In the countryside, the highest proportion of working women is to be found among middle and low classes. Among the urban population, the proportion of women employed in remunerated jobs is much lower.

Table II

Labour situation of the house-wives by social class

<u>Social Class</u>	% Women working outside	% Women working at home	% Housewives work
Rural population			
low class	6	27	66
middle c.	35	12	51
Total	18	23	59
Urban population			
low class	10	9	81
middle c.	4	12	83
upper c.	6	6	88
Total	10	10	83
Total	12	14	72%

Source: ~~Informe~~ FOESSA, 1966. page 63

The main occupations of the Spanish working women are teaching and domestic services. 62% of all teachers in the Elementary

(5)

tary schools and 31% of the secondary school are women (1). The proportion of women working in the so-called "Personal services", most of them, domestic services, reaches 68%. In minor proportion, women work in manufacturing industries (65%), textile industries (58%), business (36%) and public services (31%). In extractive industries and construction, the proportion is very low.

Table III

Proportion of active women by occupation

<u>Occupation</u>	<u>% Women</u>
Personal Services	68
Manufacturing ind.	65
Textile industries	58
Business	36
Public Services	31
...	
Coal Mines	0,7
Construction	0,1

Source: INE (Instituto Nacional de Estadística)
"Población activa" Encuesta 1964
(Madrid, 1965) pages 129 and 131.

The distribution of domestic servants by provinces shows the highest proportion in Madrid. This is so, because of the nature of Madrid's population, which is in a great

part composed of employees of the Administration, in spite of the recent industrialization around the town which has created a "new" managerial class or business class in Spain's capital. Another reason is the lower wages paid in Madrid, and in Castilla (center of Spain) in general, to the domestic servants in comparison to other regions as the Basque land and Catalonia where the general ~~living~~ ^{of living} standard is much higher.

Table IV

Distribution of domestic servants per inhabitants
and provinces

Provinces	% Domestic servants per 10.000 inhabitants
Madrid (Center)	344
Vizcaya (North)	203
Leizpuzcoa (North)	123
Valladolid (Center)	119
Barcelona (East)	117
Alava (North)	113
Jalencia (Center)	112
Zaragoza (East)	109

Source: M^o of Labour. "Memoria" 1964

INE: "Anuario Estadístico" Madrid 1965

In the South and West Spain the rate or proportion is lower, even the wages paid to the domestic servants are very low. But the ~~living~~ ^{of living} standard is also very low for

(7)

the general population. In fact, it is South Spain women who become domestic servants in the more developed areas of East and North Spain, including Madrid and Barcelona.

The existence of a very high number of domestic servants however, has not lead to a general trend of greater employment of their middle and upper class employers married women, except for certain concrete minorities, like bourgeois cultivated families and leftist students, who are aware of the necessity of women's liberation and could afford a domestic servant.

If we compare the Spanish situation with that of some European developed countries, we realize that the withdrawal of women from domestic services (2), which is a fact in Western Europe, is not yet a reality in Spain: they constitute the 68% of the total active population of Spain.

The participation of Spanish women in the teaching profession is also lower than in Western European countries, except for Germany.

Next table shows it clearly:

Table V

Women teachers in different countries

Country	% women teaching in Elementary Sc.	% women teaching in Secondary E.
Great Britain (1958)	74	47
Germany (1959)	44	37
Italy (1958)	73	56
Spain (1960)	62	31

Source: Informe FOESSA, 1966

In non-agricultural occupations, the proportion of women is 21.7%; much lower than in France with 34.4%, of the active population (3). But there is a quite high proportion of women employed in liberal professions, nearly reaching the level of England.

Table VI

Women in liberal professions and public services

Country	% Women of the total active population
Great Britain (1964)	18.6% (a)
France (1954)	13.6 (b)
Spain (1960)	17.9 (c)

Sources: (a) Vera Klein and Alva Myrdal: "Women's Two roles: Home and Work", Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd, 1968
 (b) P. Naville and G. Friedmann: "Tratado de Sociología del Trabajo"
 (c) INE "Curso de Población"

The number of working women has increased in the last years as we can see from Table I. Women constitute nearly one quarter (23,75%) of the labour force in Spain. This proportion is, again, lower than that of Western countries, where women are roughly one third of the active population (4).

However, the traditional division between "feminine" and "masculine" occupations has persisted, in the sense that women continue to occupy labour positions requiring less skill, training and responsibility, even if they have high education and skilled training.

In Spain, we can see many features of an underdeveloped country as regards the position of women in society and their consideration as labour force. The persistence of domestic services as the occupation of most Spanish working women, and the low employment in more skilled occupations, even as teachers, proves that despite the emerging process of industrialization, the traditional conception of the woman, placed in a secondary position in all aspects of the economic and social life, still persists.

Only among certain cultivated minorities, women reach the same position as men. That is the case, for example, of

certain Departments in some Spanish Universities, where women are lecturers and have the same responsibilities as their male fellows. But we cannot forget that these are exceptions, minorities in big towns (Madrid and Barcelona, mainly) and that this fact has ^{still} little importance in the general situation of the country, although it ^{will} have some influence in the long run.

EDUCATION

The second main effect of the process of economic development in Spain has been the increasing importance of education.

Although the proportion of illiterate Spanish women is still very high compared to that of other Western countries like Italy and France, it has dropped in the past fifteen years from 22% in 1950 to 13% in 1964(5). Another important aspect of this trend towards a progressive education of the feminine population is the increasing number of women attending Secondary School after 1950. In the school year 1951-1952, the rate was 107, in 1961-1962 it went up to 240(6).

To have a correct idea of the situation of the Spanish woman as regards the aspect of education we must compare it with the situation of the Spanish man. In general, little boys and little girls go to school more or less in the same proportion. In the countryside, the proportion of girls going to Elementary School is even higher than that of boys. This could be explained by the fact that the proportion of girls surviving the first years of life is higher than that of boys.

The difference between boys and girls appears in the attendance of Secondary School. There ~~are~~ we see that boys receive more edu-

ation than girls.

Table VII

Attendance of Elementary School by % of families who have children in school-going age.

	<u>boys</u>	<u>girls</u>
Towns with <u>more</u> than 10.000 inhab.	53%	55%
Towns with <u>less</u> than 10.000 inhab.	51%	50%
Countryside	75%	80%
Total	63%	66%

Source: Informe FOESSA, 1966

Table VIII

Attendance of Secondary School by % of families who have children in school-going age.

	<u>boys</u>	<u>girls</u>
Towns with <u>more</u> than 10.000 inhab.	34%	28%
Towns with <u>less</u> than 10.000 inhab.	35%	37%
Countryside	18%	14%
Total	27%	22%

Source: Informe FOESSA, 1966

In higher education the difference between boys and girls is even greater. We can see it from next Table:

Table IX

Higher education by families with school-age children.

	<u>boys</u>	<u>girls</u>
Towns with <u>more</u> than 10.000 inhab.	13%	4%
Towns with <u>less</u> than 10.000 inhab.	10%	3%
Countryside	2%	1%
Total	7%	2%

Source: Informe FOESSA, 1966

The difference is especially great in towns. In towns there are more schools than in the countryside and therefore more opportunities of higher education for both, men and women. Besides that fact, it is possible to establish a certain correlation between upper, middle and new working class (industrial workers) and urban population. Rich land-owners use to live in towns, as well. So, in general, we can assume that people who have more or less money, have the opportunities to bring their children at school, living in towns. Non skilled workers and lumpenproletariat have, at least, the chance of bringing their children to the parish school (where learning is free) or the Elementary School.

The low percentage of women studying at the University and High Schools reflects the mentality of Spanish families in provi-

ding high education for their sons and educating their daughters for marrying. Some girls have, of course, a certain degree of education. They become secretaries, nurses, they even do study at the University; most of them with the idea of becoming more attractive for possible husbands. But they do not receive, in general, the same high education as their brothers and male friends. Even among cultivated people it seems "necessary" for women to appear in a secondary position in order to get a man.

The next Table provides a proof of it. The correlation between husband's and wife's education is inverse: the more skilled and high is the former's one, the less is the latter's one.

Table X

Correlation between husband's and wife's education.

Wife's studies	Husband's studies			
	None	Elem. School	Second. School	High Education
None	77%	13%	7%	3%
Elem. School	22%	85%	70%	50%
Second. School	1%	2%	19%	6%
High. education	-0,5%	-0,5%	5%	19%

Source: Enquête FOESSA, 1966

There is quite a great homogeneity among married people who don't have any studies at all or have only attended Elementary school (77% and 85%, respectively). But of those women married to educated husbands, there is still 53% who have no education at all or very little.

However, there is 19% of women married to men with higher education, who have also received higher education. It would be necessary to consider how many of those women who receive higher education, do in fact work as professionals. The 19% may be mainly formed by women who went to the University not to obtain knowledge but to become objects of decoration and have more chances to get an educated husband.

The proportion of women studying at the University has increased enormously in the last years. In 1950, the percentage was about 14%, in the school year 1963-1964, it was 25.4%.

Women students are distributed in the several faculties of Spanish University as follows:

Table XI

Proportion of women (% of total number of students) by department or faculty.

<u>Departments</u>	<u>1945-1950</u>	<u>1963-1964</u>
Sciences (Chemistry, Physics, Biology, etc.)	21%	24%
Economics	8,6%	15,6% (↑)
Law	2,8%	
Pharmacie	43,5	11,6 (↑)
Philosophy and Languages	63,0	53,0
Medicine		62,1
Veterinary	2,6	12,0 (↑)
	0,5	2,6
Total	13,5	25,4

Source: INE "Estadística de la Enseñanza Superior en España, curso 1963-1964" (Madrid, 1966) pages: 8 and 9.

There is a great proportion, 62%, of women studying "Filosofía y Letras", which corresponds to the English Departments of classic and modern languages, history, pedagogy, and Philosophy. These women become, in general, teachers at the State's or at private schools. 53% of students of Pharmacie are women. This high proportion is due to the possibility of their middle and upper-class parents buying a chemist's shop for them when they finish their degree; in Spain only authorized holders of a degree can open these kind

of drops.

The proportion of women studying medicine, law and Economics has increased enormously since 1950. These studies are more or less humanistic and are therefore preferred by girls, because of the general opinion that they are more "adequate" for girls, ~~to~~ more "feminine". That is the main reason of the fact that the proportion of women in technical and scientific departments has remained the same, despite the fact that the total proportion of technical students has increased from 8% in 1958-1959 to 22.2% in 1963-1964 (7), as a consequence of the perspectives of economic development of the country.

CONCLUSION

(19)

We can conclude that marriage is still a career for Spanish women, whatever their degree of education is, which implies a great deal of waste of skill and training of women who get education and do not make use of it.

Among working women the same feeling for marriage exists, in the sense, that most of single women rely on the mental reservation that once they will get married they will get out of their job. This means that Spanish women take their job as transitory, without any desire of taking it seriously or going more deeply into it.

On the other hand the status of married woman is much better considered in Spanish society. There is still a general feeling about single women, in the sense, that they work as a substitute of family life, which is, in fact, the aspiration of most of Spanish girls.

Family life tends to be placed on the top of the hierarchy of activities of the woman in Spain. When the woman is working, she must reconcile her job and her family responsibilities, which is not the case for the man. This implies that she is not free to take whatever job she likes, because she must combine motherhood and the

care of a home with outside activities.

The consequence of this is the untenable division between "feminine" and "masculine" activities, which helps to perpetuate the social discrimination between sexes.

A possible solution of the problem of the women in society, placed in a secondary position had to be a reorganization of life in such a way that women with children could do any work, even works which require a high degree of concentration, which is difficult to achieve when concurrent domestic responsibilities also call for attention (8). This means the creation of nurseries, "collective houses", and other help than domestic servants, which is a very unpleasant job.

But this solution can only take place in the framework of a more general social change or even revolution, that made change people's mentality on women and placed her in an egalitarian position in relation to man. Until women will not be required and necessary in all steps of the economic production and in the organization of social life, this change does not seem to be possible.

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I am sorry I could n't get much information from Spain, because of the Postal strike
Interesting books to consult are:
Aurelia Campesano: "La Dama de Catalunya"
Margarita Perey: "El trabajo femenino".